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SUMMARY
The governments of both the United States and China maintain
the death penalty as a means of punishing its most dangerous criminals,
but with an astounding 68 capital offenses, China perennially remains
the world leader in executions. This article examines the theory of
proportionality of criminal punishment and how it relates to the
respective death penalty policies in the United States and China. A
comparative analysis will reveal two extremely different societies
with two different perspectives on proportionality. one that
recognizes and protects fundamental freedoms and another that
places emphasis on collective societal welfare over individual
rights. The article will describe how constitutional and legislative
provisions, specific historical periods, human rights, and the
judicial system interact to shape the policies that the United States
and China practice today.
SJ.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 2009: B.A.. Psychology,
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A. INTRODUCTION
Political activists have long cited religious intolerance,
media censorship, and stringent birth control policies as indications
of China's poor human rights reputation. In an effort to win its
first-ever Olympics bid in 2001, Beijing assured the International
Olympic Committee that China would improve its human rights
record.' In 2004, China amended its constitution by inserting a
stipulation governing human rights;2 the amendment declares
simply, "[lt]he State respects and preserves human rights." 3 As the
2008 Summer Olympics drew nearer, however, China faced
pressure and criticism for failing to uphold its promise. Human
rights organizations have reprimanded China for its failure to use
its influence to halt the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, its religious
and cultural oppression in Tibet, and its imprisonment of political
dissidents.
4
Seemingly lost amidst the mass of human rights outcries is
the opposition to China's extensive and liberal use of the death
penalty. Although the government does not officially release
statistics, Amnesty International reported that China executed
1,010 people in 2006, representing almost two-thirds of the 1,591
put to death worldwide that year. 5 While the figure significantly
dropped from its total of 1,770 in 2005, some activists believe that
because of state secrecy, the number of executions could be as high
as 10,000 to 15,000 per year.6
1 David Pierson, China Gets Low Grade in Human Rights; Amnesty International, Citing
Detentions, Finds Beijing Hasn't Lived up to Its Promises Ahead of the 2008 Olympics,
L.A. TiMEs. May 1. 2007. at A3.
2 Zou KEYuAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 3 (2006).
3 XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 33 (2004) (P.R.C.).
4 Evan Osnos, Host Feels the Heat as Games Approach; Spielberg's Exit Is One More
Hurdle for China, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 2008, at C1.
5 The United States, by comparison, executed only 53 people in 2006. Amnesty
International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty (1 January 2007). Apr. 27. 2007.
http://archive.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT500022007 John M. Glionna, China
Shows Caution on Executions; Facing Pressure Before the Olympics, Beiing's Policy Is
to 'Kill Fewer, Kill Carefully. 'Activists Urge More Legal Reforms. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6.
2008, at A6.
6 Glionna, supra note 5.
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Under federal American law,7 there are only two crimes,
other than murder and felonies that result in death, that are subject
to capital punishment: espionage 8 and treason. 9 By stark contrast,
sixty-eight offenses, including such non-violent crimes as tax fraud
and counterfeiting currency, carry the death penalty in China.'
0
One man, in recent years, was sentenced to death for stealing a
cellular phone, 11 and just last year, two prominent government
officials were executed for taking bribes. 12 China's broad use of
the death penalty, especially when compared to the United States
and other nations, no doubt raises serious issues regarding theories
of proportionality, that is, whether the punishment fits the crime.
For instance, in China, a person convicted of manufacturing 100
grams of heroin may be subject to the death penalty.' 3 In the
United States, a person found guilty of a similar offense may be
sentenced to only five years in prison. 14 Such a wide disparity in
sentencing guidelines naturally leads one to contemplate the
driving forces behind the Chinese penal system and the
relationship between crime and punishment.
Facing mounting domestic and international criticism for
what activists and legal scholars deemed "widespread and arbitrary
use of the death penalty," China's legislature, the National
People's Congress, adopted a new law in 2006 restoring power to
its highest tribunal, the Supreme People's Court, to review all
7 Unlike the United States, which has federal and state laws, China's criminal codes are
national laws that are uniformly applied and enforced throughout all of its provinces.
Therefore, for purposes of this paper and the sake of comparison, only federal American
crimes will be referenced.
8 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
9 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
10 See generally Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996), translated in WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION (1998)
[hereinafter Criminal Code].
' Glionna, supra note 5.
12 Alexa Olesen, China Orders New Limits on the Use of Death Penalty. WASH. POST.
Sep. 15. 2007, at A13.
13 Criminal Code supra note 10, art. 347, at 180-82.
14 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000).
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death sentences handed down by lower courts.1 5  While some
human rights groups welcomed what was believed to be "the most
important reform of capital punishment in China in more than two
decades,"' 6 others remained skeptical. Amnesty International,
claiming there were inconsistencies in how the reform was
implemented, counted 17 executions between January 1 and March
19, 2007, according to Chinese news reports; the Supreme
People's Court, however, reported only four during that same
period. 17  Others dismissed the government's efforts as merely
"stopgap" and questioned the integrity of the judicial system. 18
The primary objective of this article is to explore
proportionality of crime and punishment in China, surveying
offenses and respective penalties in China while examining the
theories, justifications, and historical bearings that drive them. A
comparative analysis between the United States and China will be
presented as well, portraying two extremely different societies with
different historical and cultural influences. The United States
exhibits an individualistic society that has traditionally recognized
and protected fundamental rights, and its judicial system has
generally adhered to a concept of proportionality under the Eighth
15 Decision of the Supreme People's Court on the Exclusive Exercise of the
Power to Review Death Penalty Cases, Dec. 28, 2006, available at
http://www. lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db- 1 &id-574 I&keyword-organ
ic%201aw%20courts; David Lague, China Moves to Lessen the Broad Use of
Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A3.
16 Lague, supra note 15.
17 Pierson, supra note 1.
18 See Maureen Fan, Report Faults China on Rights Failures; Olympics an
Excuse for Arrests, Amnesty Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at A1O (T.
Kumar of Amnesty International commented, "It's only about a year to go [until
the Olympics] and we don't see any genuine effort by the Chinese
administration to improve human rights... [T]he public statement about extra
review for the death penalty... [is] just enough to keep the criticism at bay.");
Glionna, supra note 5 (Sharon Hom, director of Human Rights in China,
similarly expressed doubts about the reform: "So you have the return of an
important piece of review... [b]ut you're reviewing a system that is still
politicized, that still does not welcome independent judges and where lawyers
raising questions about abuse or torture are being harassed and beaten up.").
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Amendment of the Constitution. China, by contrast, is a
collectivist nation that values societal welfare over individual
rights. Its idea of proportionality is largely influenced by political
leaders and governmental objectives. Both the United States and
China demonstrate theories of punishment that draw upon
utilitarian and retributive perspectives, but China appears to place
more of an emphasis on the latter. Furthermore, legislative
provisions, historical factors, and a unique judicial system each
play a significant role in molding China into the world leader in
executions it is today. Part B of the paper will describe the major
theories of punishment and the doctrine of proportionality and how
they relate. Part C examines constitutional and legislative
provisions, including the notion of cruel and unusual punishment
as established by the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
This section also explores whether and to what extent Chinese law
observes an analogous concept. Part D will outline how specific
eras in China's history have influenced its death penalty policy.
Finally, Part E describes reactions from human rights organizations
and Part F questions the future of judicial reform.
B. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND
THE DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY
In many cultures, when citizens commit crimes, they are
charged, prosecuted, and punished by the government on society's
behalf. Such punishment generally takes the form of inflicting
pain or causing one to suffer some consequence that is ordinarily
considered to be unpleasant. Citizens have a vested interest in
their government operating in a fair and just manner, and because
punishment involves pain or some deprivation of liberty or
property, its intentional imposition by the state naturally requires
justification. 19 In order to properly determine the manner and
degree of punishment, one must first establish the basis on which
punishment is justified and the reasons punishment is sought.
Without an understanding of why penalties are imposed and what
19 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 11-12 (4th ed. 2006).
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they aim to achieve, one can hardly hope to gain a solid
comprehension of the proportionality principle.
20
When the authorities have determined that a person is
responsible for a criminal act and penal sanctions are deemed
appropriate, legislators must decide how much punishment is
necessary to achieve the desired goal of their judicial system. The
idea that the punishment should fit the crime has been analyzed by
commentators, institutions, and courts for years. In a general
sense, as one scholar argues, a person is not justified in punishing
another unless it is "proportional or reasonable in relation to the
harm threatened or the interest to be furthered. ' ,2 1 In the context of
sentencing, the American Model Penal Code declares that one of
its general purposes is to "safeguard offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment." 22  This principle is
echoed in constitutional law through United States Supreme Court
opinions as well as the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which prohibits grossly disproportional
punishment.
23
The following section describes the major theories of
punishment, namely utilitarianism and retributivism, and their
relationship with the proportionality doctrine. It will also
intermittently speculate as to how the major theories interact with
proportionality to influence death penalty policy in both the United
States and China.
L Utilitarianism and Proportionality
According to Jeremy Bentham, often referred to as the
father of classical utilitarianism, the purpose of the law is to
maximize the net happiness of society, and laws should therefore
20 Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 597,
598 (1999).
21 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 87 (1984).
22 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(c) (1962).
23 See infra Part C (discussing cruel and unusual punishment).
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be used to avoid all painful or unpleasant experiences. 24
Proponents of this theory believe that in deciding whether to
punish, the authorities should engage in a cost-benefit analysis in
which punishment should be inflicted only if the good that results
from the punishment will outweigh the bad. In the same manner, a
''person contemplating criminal [conduct] will balance the
expected benefits" of the activity "against [the] risks... [and]
severity of the likely punishment," avoiding the conduct "if the
perceived potential pain" or deprivation "outweighs the expected
potential pleasure" derived from committing the crime.
25
Utilitarianism seeks to justify punishment by pointing to
the useful purposes it serves. The most commonly cited and
recognizable goal of utilitarianism is deterrence, of which there are
two types: general and specific. 2 6 General deterrence is the basic
knowledge that punishment will naturally follow the commission
of a crime. Observing others who are punished for certain
behavior creates a sense of association between the punishment
and the conduct, which ostensibly constrains people from acting
wrongfully. An individual's punishment teaches society in general
about what conduct is or is not permissible, and instills fear of
punishment in potential violators of the law.27  With specific
deterrence, the actual imposition of punishment reminds the
24 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1879).
25 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 15.
26 Id.; Cf id. at 15-16 (Other principal objectives of utilitarianism include
incapacitation and rehabilitation. The former seeks to permanently or
temporarily remove criminals from the general population and prevent them
from acting upon their destructive tendencies, which often takes the form of
incarceration. The latter seeks to reform the wrongdoer so that his wish to
commit crimes will be curtailed. Common methods include psychiatric
treatment, drug addition therapy, and vocational training.); because these goals
do not seek to justify capital punishment, they are therefore beyond the scope of
this article.
27 Id. at 15.
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offender that if he repeats the act, he will be punished again." For
instance, if a person serves a five-year prison sentence for
distributing illegal drugs, he will theoretically think twice before
committing the same crime. The goal of deterrence is therefore a
net reduction in crime, for if potential violators are aware of the
risk and severity of punishment, they are less likely to engage in
criminal conduct.
In order to comport with the proportionality doctrine,
utilitarianism directs that punishment be inflicted consistent with
the amount required, but no more than is required, to achieve its
goals of crime prevention. 29  According to Bentham, there are
certain rules designed to ensure that punishment is administered in
a proportional fashion. First, the value of the punishment must not
be less than what is sufficient to outweigh the profit of committing
the crime. 30 If the punishment is inadequate, the crime will remain
profitable to the actor and the threat of punishment will be
ineffective. Second, Bentham directs legislators to grade
punishments in a manner that will encourage a person to "choose
always the least mischievous of two offences," by ensuring that
when any two offenses are in competition, "the punishment for the
greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the
less." 31 Theft, for instance, should carry less punishment than
murder in order to induce a criminal to commit the less harmful
act. Although one may assume theft is universally considered a
less harmful act than murder, China's criminal code offers little
guidance to potential criminals in this regard. Both the United
States and China consider murder a capital offense. However, in
the United States, theft of government money, for instance, carries
a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment, 32 whereas
"stealing an extraordinarily large amount of money" from a
28 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1282, 1287 (Joshua Dressier ed., 2d ed. 2002).
29 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 54.
30 BENTHAM, supra note 24, at 179.
31 [d. at 181.
32 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).
v. 16
THE [CAPITAL] PUNISHMENT FITS THE CRIME
financial institution in China may warrant the death penalty. 33
How, then, can the potential criminal be expected to choose the
"least mischievous" of the two offenses where the punishments are
equally severe? Perhaps China's criminal code and administration
of punishment goes too far in inflicting more pain than what is
required to achieve its goals. It remains to be seen, however,
exactly what those goals entail.
II. Retributivism and Proportionality
The fundamental thrust behind the retributive theory of
punishment is "just deserts" and moral culpability. Punishment of
criminals is justified simply because they deserve it. 34 In contrast
to utilitarianism, which looks to the future and to the potential
societal benefits of punishment, the retributive theory looks to the
past and justifies punishment solely on the basis of the voluntary
commission of a crime. Therefore, because humans generally
possess free will, they may be justly blamed and penalized when
they choose to violate the law.
35
In contrast to utilitarian punishment, which is linked to
predictions of future harm and the extent to which the undesired
conduct can be deterred, retributivism seeks to compare
punishment to the offense already committed, without
consideration of future harm.36 As discussed above, retributive
punishment is justified by the criminal's blameworthiness. In
order to devise a system of proportional punishment based on
retributive principles, one may simply declare that the degree of
punishment should be proportional to the gravity of the crime.
However, in the absence of an "eye for an eye" system of
33 Criminal Code supra note 10, art. 264, at 147-48.
34 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987), 179-82.
35 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 17.
36 Id. at 58-59.
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punishment,37 penalties can only roughly estimate the seriousness
of the crime committed. Therefore, one must take the extra step of
attempting to quantify the severity of the punishment and the crime
while explaining how the two correspond to one another.
According to one scholar, when assessing the severity of a
crime, one must take into account both the degree of harm caused
and the actor's level of moral culpability.38 For instance, murder is
considered more serious than robbery because "the harm is greater
and it is more serious than negligent homicide because the actor's
culpability is greater." 39 Thus, a legislature seeking to develop a
retributive system of proportional punishment will first examine
the crime in question and determine what harm ordinarily results
from the commission of such an offense. In the United States, for
instance, people generally regard violent crimes (e.g. homicide and
rape) as being more harmful and serious than non-violent offenses
(e.g. bribery and fraud). Additionally, in evaluating the culpability
component, the legislature will consider the criminal's state of
mind and the circumstances surrounding the act. The intentional
commission of a crime will presumably deserve harsher
punishment than one committed recklessly or negligently.
40
However, this ultimately begs the question of whether, for
instance, an intentional robbery deserves more or less punishment
than a negligent homicide.
So how exactly do Chinese lawmakers evaluate the severity
of a crime and the moral responsibility of a criminal? What is the
rationale behind making the penalties for tax evasion and murder
equally severe? Considering China's numerous capital offenses,
including non-violent crimes, one must determine what roles the
37 This is the archaic concept of doing to the offender, as punishment, exactly
what the offender did to the victim. For instance, if the offender kills the victim,
the offender must be killed as punishment. Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34
ARIz. L. REV. 25, 26 (1992).
38 Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From
"Why Punish" to "How much?", I CRIM. L.F. 259, 266 (1990).
39 Id (emphasis added).
40 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 57-58.
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factors of history, philosophy, and culture play in its criminal
justice system.41
III. The Penalty Scale: How Much Punishment?
According to the doctrine of proportionality, people
convicted of crimes of comparable gravity should receive
punishments of comparable severity. But how exactly does one
measure the gravity of the crime and the severity of the
corresponding punishment? One cannot simply determine, for
instance, that the serious crime of armed robbery deserves an
"equally" serious punishment of, say, ten years in prison. In order
to avoid such a dangerously arbitrary and subjective system,
crimes and punishments cannot be perceived or analyzed in the
abstract. Therefore, one scholar introduces the notion of cardinal
proportionality, which aims to set "anchoring points" on a penalty
scale.42 If the state has set the punishments for certain crimes, then
it can fix the penalty for crime "X" by comparing the typical
seriousness of the crime with the seriousness of other crimes.
43
The process, however, requires a starting point from which the
state can gradually increase or decrease the punishment according
to the severity of the crime. The propriety of a punishment
therefore depends on how the scale has been anchored, what limits
or bounds have been set, and what penalties have been fixed for
other crimes. 44 An extremely harsh penalty scale, for example,
might set a lower limit that imposes several years' imprisonment
for its least serious crimes, while it's more serious crimes would
carry even more severe penalties as they approach the upper limit.
The objection to such a stringent formula depends on one's moral
assumptions. On the one hand, in a society that highly values
fundamental rights, like the United States, a lengthy prison term
involving a major deprivation of liberty for such a minor crime
would likely violate the proportionality principle. On the other
41 See infra Part E.
42 Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 282.
43 Id.
44 [d. at 283.
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hand, in a society with a social ethic that minimizes the value of
individual rights, like China, that same crime may indeed justify
the seemingly disproportional punishment.
45
Assuming, arguendo, that China has devised a penalty
scale, on its face, the fact that China has 68 capital offenses makes
its judicial system appear grossly disproportional, as minor and
mid-level crimes seem to pile up on the most serious punishment
end of the penalty spectrum. Therefore, perhaps China sets a
relatively high anchoring point, closing the gap between its lower
and upper bounds. Assuming homicide and capital punishment
stand alone at the upper limit of the United States' penalty scale, it
is likely that China perceives many more crimes as equally severe
and reprehensible, and they are therefore equally deserving of the
upper limit punishment of death. The next section explores how
the United States and China have dealt with the proportionality
issue through constitutional interpretation and legislative
enactments.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
I. The UnitedStates
a. The Constitution and Historical Interpretation
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment" by
government agents on persons convicted of crimes. 46 When the
Framers of the Constitution drafted the Bill of Rights, their intent
in enacting a ban on cruel and unusual punishment was twofold: to
restrain legislative power to prescribe punishment for crimes, and
to issue a warning to the courts not to abuse their discretion.
47
41 Id. at 283-84.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
47 Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Louisiana's Newest Capital Crime: The Death
Penalty for Child Rape, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 719-20 (1999).
This idea of checks and balance that pervades throughout American
constitutional law is not recognized in China's single-party system of
govermnent. See infra Part F.II.b.
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However, there is very little evidence regarding how the Framers
intended to define the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, so
the United States Supreme Court assumed the task of interpreting
its meaning in a number of landmark decisions. In 1878, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture and punishments
of "unnecessary cruelty, ' ,48 but later clarified that the punishment
of death itself is not cruel. 49 The first discussion of proportionality
appeared two years later in O'Neil v. Vermont, where the dissent
interpreted the Clause to prohibit "all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offenses charged." 50 In Weems v. United States, a majority of the
Court finally articulated a proportionality guideline, ruling that
"punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
[the] offense.",51 The Court reasoned that the Framers must have
intended that the ban on cruel and unusual punishment included
penalties disproportionate to the offense.
52
In addition, the Court further noted the Clause's flexibility,
stating that it "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice. '53  Several decades later, the
Court echoed this sentiment in Trop v. Dulles, asserting that the
"[Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."5 4 The Court therefore began to base its standard on the
morality of contemporary society.55 As society's attitude towards
human rights and crimes changed, so did the meaning of the
Clause. If people began to perceive a particular crime as especially
harmful or reprehensible, the Clause would take on a more narrow
48 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (citations omitted).
49 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
50 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
5 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
52 Id. at 372-73.
53 Id. at 378 (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885); Mackin v.
United States, 117 U.S. 348, 350 (1886)).
54 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
55 Sander Jacobowitz, Rattling Chains and Smashing Rocks: Testing the
Boundaries of the Eighth Amendment, 28 RUTGERs L.J. 519, 525 (1997).
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meaning. Conversely, if people increasingly perceived certain
punishments as severe deprivations of liberty or violations of
dignity, the Clause would ultimately cast a larger net. As
discussed later, China does not value fundamental individual rights
as highly as American society. 56 Therefore, its concept of cruel
and unusual punishment, if there is one at all, will naturally have a
much different meaning.
The Weems line of cases declared that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause must be analyzed according to public
perceptions of standards of decency. In Gregg v. Georgia, the
Court found such scrutiny insufficient and went a step further,
ruling that a penalty must also comport with basic concepts of
human dignity, which essentially means that the punishment must
not be "excessive. '" 57 According to this heightened standard, a
punishment "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain [and] must not be grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. '58 As we shall see, Chinese law lacks a
provision directly analogous to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, and it is unclear whether any standard of decency or
human dignity is given any consideration or weight when
administering death sentences.
b. Coker and Modern Interpretation
One year after Gregg, the Court's struggle with the
proportionality issue reached its peak in Coker v. Georgia, where it
ruled that the death penalty for raping an adult woman constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. 59 The Court asserted that capital
punishment for the crime of rape is "grossly disproportionate and
excessive" and "therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
60
Consistent with Weems and Trop, the Court cited evidence of
contemporary society's attitude towards imposing the death
56 See infra Part C.III.
57428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
58 Id. (citations omitted).
59 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).60 [d.
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penalty for rape, noting that Georgia was one of only three states at
the time that authorized such punishment. 61 Evocative of Andrew
von Hirsch's penalty scale and "anchoring points," 62 the Court
went on to address the relative seriousness of rape, comparing its
degree of harm and moral culpability to murder. The Court defined
rape as an especially violent crime, which "short of homicide... is
the 'ultimate violation of the self.', 63 However, it stopped short of
placing rape alongside murder at the "upper limit" of the penalty
scale, concluding that rape, while exceptionally reprehensible, was
not as serious as murder in terms of the criminal's
blameworthiness and the resulting injury. 64  The Court further
explained its rationale regarding the proportionality doctrine:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of
the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life.. .rape by definition
does not include the death of or even the serious
injury to another person. The murderer kills; the
rapist...does not... We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which "is unique in its
severity and irrevocability," is an excessive penalty
for the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life.65
While some of the passage's assertions are certainly
debatable, the Court evidently drew a bright line between crimes
that result in loss of life and those that do not, concluding that
61 Id. at 595-96 (emphasizing that Georgia was the only one of the three that
authorized the death penalty for rape of an adult. Florida and Mississippi only
imposed such punishment if the victim was a child).
62 See supra Part II.C.
63 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
64 [d.
651 d. at 598.
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rapists do not take the lives of their victims and therefore do not
deserve the death penalty.
66
Concerning the degree of harm caused by rape, the Coker
Court observed that rape not only involves the obvious private
injury to the victim, but because the crime "undermines the
community's sense of security," there is a public injury as well. 67
The latter harm is perhaps what carries the most weight in the eyes
of the Chinese criminal justice system. As discussed in the next
section, in contrast to the United States, China discounts individual
rights in favor of the collective social good. Thus, when a crime
such as rape so severely disrupts society's sense of security and
well being, the government will likely regard the crime as
warranting the harshest of punishments.
II. China
a. Constitution of the People's Republic of China
The Preamble to the Constitution and its initial provisions
acknowledge the leadership of the Communist Party and
emphasizes the dominance of the socialist society over the
individual. 68 However, the fourth and most recent version of the
Constitution contains an extensive section on the fundamental
rights of citizens. 69 Specifically, Article 35 guarantees standard
civil and political rights similar to those included in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution: "freedom of speech,
of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration." 70 Article 37, comparable to the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, prohibits arrest
without "approval or by decision of a people's procuratorate
or... court," the "unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens'
66 Fleming, supra note 47, at 727.
67 433 U.S. at 598.
68 See, e.g., XIAN FA art. 1, (1982) (P.R.C.) ("The socialist system is the basic
system of the People's Republic of China. Sabotage of the socialist system by
any... individual is prohibited.").
69 See generally XIAN FA. art. 33-50 (1982) (P.R.C.).
70 Id. at art. 35.
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freedom of person by detention or other means," and the "unlawful
search of the person of citizens."
71
Despite numerous passages protecting individual liberties
that mirror the American Bill of Rights, a thorough examination of
China's Constitution reveals no provision analogous to the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 72 and
thus no concept of proportionality. In fact, aside from Article 37,
quoted above, the Constitution contains very little penal and
procedural protections. Moreover, the same chapter that contains a
large section on individual freedoms also includes a number of
provisions that outline the fundamental duties of citizens. 73 One
article in particular reiterates the importance of government and
societal interests over individual rights: "The exercise by
citizens.. .of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the
interests of the state, of society and of the collective." 74 Thus,
whereas American society highlights the significance of individual
civil liberties, China emphasizes "order over freedom, duties over
rights, and group interests over individual ones." 75  This stark
political contrast may explain, to some degree, why China lacks an
excessive punishment provision, in addition to the more
comprehensive list of individual rights that United States citizens
enjoy.
b. Chinese Criminal Procedure Law
The two principal sources of criminal law in China are the
1996 Amended Criminal Procedure Law and the 1997 Criminal
Code. The National People's Congress passed the former in
71 Id. at art. 37.
72 Article 38 protects the inviolable "personal dignity" of citizens, but this
section appears to be limited to libel and false charges.
7, See generally XIAN FA. art. 51-56, (1982) (P.R.C.).
74 Id. at art. 51.
71 SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO
CHINA 171 (1985).
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response to abuses by law enforcement officials, scrutiny of
China's human rights record, and general calls for reform by legal
scholars and professionals. Key changes included separation
between administrative and judicial systems, enhancement of
attorneys' involvement in criminal proceedings, and the
establishment of a legal aid system for indigent criminal
defendants. 76  The amendments also provided for Westernized
procedural protections, such as the notion that criminals are
"innocent until proven guilty," the right to a jury trial, and due
process of law. 77 However, the general purposes of the revision,
while affording several protections and rights, include no
prohibition of excessive punishment.78  Thus, while Chinese
criminal defendants enjoy the right to defense counsel and the right
to appeal, they are not necessarily or expressly shielded from
"cruel and unusual" punishment.
c. Chinese Criminal Code
One year after the modification of the Criminal Procedure
Law, the National People's Congress drafted a new Criminal Code,
providing for, among other reforms, equal application of the law,
parole improvements, and abolishment of the death penalty for
people under the age of eighteen. 79  The modified Code also
introduced a concept of proportionality: "The punishment shall be
equivalent to the criminal acts committed by the offenders and the
criminal responsibilities that the offenders shall bear."
80
According to Andrew von Hirsch's retributive theory of
proportionality, 81 when assessing the severity of a crime, one must
take into account both the degree of harm caused and the actor's
76 See generally WEI LUO, THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND THE
CRIMINAL COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 5-20 (2000).
77 AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
[hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 12-14.78 Id. at art. 1-2.
79 See generally WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9-13 (1998).
8o CRIMINAL CODE art. 5.
81 See supra Part B.11.
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level of moral culpability. China appears to adopt a similar
formula in that the Code plainly considers both the nature of the
wrongful act and the criminal's blameworthiness in determining
the appropriate punishment. More specifically, regarding the
unlawful act itself, the Code provides that "a punishment shall be
imposed based on the facts, nature and circumstances of the crime,
the degree of harm done to society and the relevant provisions of
this Law." 82 Furthermore, when assessing the defendant's moral
responsibility, the Code considers aggravating and mitigating
factors such as intent, negligence, unforeseeable circumstances,
age, mental and physical disabilities, and self-defense. 83 Although
the legislature finally adopted a concept of proportionality in its
Criminal Code, like the Criminal Procedure Law, the Code lacks
any sort of protection against excessive punishment.
III. Comparing American and Chinese Principles
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Coker v.
Georgia provides an accurate depiction of how the American
criminal justice system perceives and ensures proportional
punishments. The Court focuses on the nature and severity of the
crime as well as circumstances surrounding the unlawful act
including the defendant's moral culpability. Likewise, the Chinese
Criminal Code considers the degree of the harm caused and the
criminal's level of blameworthiness in measuring the amount of
punishment to be imposed. Both penal systems, therefore, adopt
what appears to be the same retributive theory of proportionality.
Why, then, does China retain an inordinate amount of capital
offenses and continue to execute criminals at an astonishing pace?
Perhaps China's understanding of proportionality is not as
deeply rooted in history and tradition as it is in the United States.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
ratified in 1791, and the judiciary has since strived to preserve its
legacy and enforce its objectives through case law and guidelines,
82 CRIMINAL CODE art. 61.
83 [d. at art. 14-21.
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as it continues to do so to this day.8 4  China's principle of
proportional punishment (at least its recorded notion), on the other
hand, was introduced a mere decade ago in the revised Criminal
Code. Perhaps the legislature and courts have yet to seriously
undertake the issue of defining precisely what it means to
administer punishment "equivalent to the criminal acts committed
by the offenders and the criminal responsibilities that the offenders
shall bear." 85 Similarly, it took the United States Supreme Court
75 years after the Eighth Amendment's ratification to finally
address the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
86
Western nations like the United States maintain
individualistic societies whereas Eastern nations like China adopt
collectivist ideals. Thus, it is no surprise that while the United
States goes to great lengths to protect fundamental rights, China
discounts the value of individual liberties in favor of government
stability and societal interests. Accordingly, "whenever the social
order is perceived by the Chinese elites as threatened, legal niceties
are usually set aside;" 87 the ultimate result manifests itself in
massive crime prevention campaigns and harsher punishments.
The next section outlines and examines Chinese political and legal
history and the major sources of law that continue to play a
significant role in sustaining the collectivist society that China is
today.
D. HISTORY AND SOURCES OF CHINESE LAW
The features of law in a given society and at a particular historical
stage are shaped not only by the prevailing environment of that
time, but also by the cultural heritage of that society, though the
84 See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007) (holding
that a judge may consider the disparity between the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses when imposing a
punishment "greater than necessary" to serve the objectives of sentencing).
85 CRIMINAL CODE art. 5.
86 Fleming, supra note 47, at 720; see Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475
(1866).
87 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 171.
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role of culture and tradition in shaping the law may be muted,
implicit and even unconscious. Thus a study of current Chinese
law requires some basic understanding of legal traditions in
China. 
88
As in any developing nation, the laws of China have been
influenced by history, culture, and contemporary ideas. This
section will examine competing philosophical principles, outline
the major periods of Chinese legal history, and explore how each
influenced the government's death penalty policy.
L Philosophical Influences
The Chinese criminal justice system is rooted in the ancient
philosophical theories of Legalism and Confucianism. The former
school of thought regarded law as the "conscious creation and fiat
of the lawgiver" while the latter held that law was "a reflection of
moral righteousness and justice." 89
[T]he Legalists laid all their emphasis on positive
law (Fa) which was to be the pure will of the
lawgiver irrespective of what the generally accepted
mores or morality might be, and be capable of
running quite contrary to it if the welfare of the state
should so require... [T]he Confucians (Ju chia)
adhered to the body of ancient custom...which
unnumbered generations of Chinese people had
instinctively felt to be right - this was li, and we
may equate it with natural law.
90
For most of China's history, Confucianism prevailed and
the government generally adhered to its principles.
9 1
88 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE
LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (1999).
89 Foreign Law Guide: China (People's Republic of China) I,
http://foreignlawguide.com/ip/flg/China / 20Introduction.htm.
90 Id. at 11 n.1.
91 d. at 1.
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Confucianism introduced the concept of the importance of society
over the individual.92  Confucians believed that the goal of
government was to preserve social harmony, and societal well
being always trumped individual rights. 93  Along with this
collectivist notion came the historical deference to ancestors, heads
of state, and members of the elite class; the application of the law
was generally left to the discretion of the individual leader at the
time. Under what was called the "rule of the person" system, each
authority figure could base decisions on prevailing beliefs,
convenience and practicality, and the status of the person to be
punished. 94 Lasting through Mao Zedong's tenure, 95 this concept
resulted in a wide array of vastly different punishments for what
were often similar offenses. 96 It therefore seems that Confucian
ideals offered no concept of proportionality, but instead looked to
government leaders for guidance on how to administer appropriate
punishments, a pattern that would persist throughout Chinese
history.
II. Imperial China
During the Chinese imperial era, people believed that
strong leadership was necessary for the maintenance of a stable
environment and the preservation of social harmony, and the law
of the imperial codes was used to reinforce that leadership.
97
Consistent with Confucian ideals, Chinese imperial codes were
generally "less concerned with the defendant's individual rights
than with imperial interests, such as maintaining social stability
92 Pamella A. Seay, Law, Crime, and Punishment in the People's Republic of
China: A Comparative Introduction to the Criminal Justice and Legal System of
the People's Republic of China, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 143 (1998).
93 Jeremy T. Monthy, Internal Perspectives on Chinese Human Rights Reform:
The Death Penalty in the PRC, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 189, 194 (1998).
94 Seay, supra note 92, at 143.
9' See infra Part D.IV.
96 Seay, supra note 92, at 143.
97 Meaghan Sunderland, Criminal Law Reform in the People's Republic of
China: Any Hope for Those Facing the Death Penalty?, 8 APPEAL 18, 20
(2002).
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and enhancing the power of the ruling class and ideology." 98 As
early as the Tang Code of 653 A.D., capital punishment was
codified, and each imperial code thereafter included more than one
hundred capital offenses. 99 Various imperial codes sanctioned the
death penalty for many crimes, and included elaborate formulas to
calculate mitigating and aggravating circumstances, premised on
the notion that "punishment should correspond to the seriousness
of the offense, as determined by its repercussions on universal
harmony."' 100 Despite the perceived harshness of the criminal
justice system, imperial China remained committed to promoting
the interests of the state via the enforcement of its codes. The
government viewed individual rights as a secondary matter. While
imperial China appeared to be generally concerned with
proportional punishment, it focused specifically on the death
penalty, determining which method of execution was appropriate
for a given crime. For instance, codes established the means of
execution (decapitation, strangulation, or "slicing") not only with
reference to the amount of pain the criminal would suffer, but
primarily to its impact on the criminal's "soul" after death. 1 1
Early imperial codes therefore reflected retributive ideals of
proportional punishment.
During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the last imperial
period, capital punishment was authorized for the commission of
"heinous" crimes. Like its predecessors, the Qing Code was not
concerned with the disputes of private individuals or the notion of
rights, but rather focused on directing local authorities to impose
punishment for crimes that the state perceived to be legally
significant. 10 2  The state implemented laws to ensure that its
98 Stephen B. Davis, The Death Penalty and Legal Reform in the PRC, I J.
CHINESE L. 303, 307 (1987).
99 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 19.
100 Davis, supra note 98, at 306.
101 Id. at 307.
102 William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System,
in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 11-15 (C. Stephen Hsu ed.,
2003).
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interests were advanced, and as this was done, the interests of
private individuals were often protected as an indirect result. 103 Of
greatest concern to lawmakers were matters that threatened the
security of the state and the preservation of social order, 104 and the
harshest penalties in the Code were reserved for crimes that were
regarded as a threat to the continued existence of the state.10 5 The
original Qing Code contained a total of 275 capital offenses, but by
the end of the era, the number swelled to an astounding 840 crimes
punishable by death. 10 6 Despite the perceived harshness of the
criminal justice system, imperial China remained committed to
promoting the interests of the state via the enforcement of its
codes. Again, individual rights were viewed as a secondary
matter.
III. Nationalism and the pre-PRC Communists (1911-1949)
During the last years of the Qing Dynasty, reformers began
efforts to draft new codes that reflected a western influence, and
Chinese leaders began traveling abroad to study western law.
107
When the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911 and China became a republic,
the Nationalist Party assumed power and continued efforts to
establish a western style legal system. Following Japan's lead in
emulating European criminal justice systems, the new government
created new legal codes, including the Criminal Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure, 10 8 and drastically reduced the number of
capital offenses to approximately twenty. 109  The reforms,
however, were relatively short-lived and never fully realized.
During the 1940s, the Nationalists were engaged in civil war with
103Id. at 15-16.
104 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 20.
105 Monthy, supra note 93, at 201.
106 DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT FRONTIER:
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN
ASIA (forthcoming Jan. 2009) (manuscript at 38-39, on file with the University
of Miami International & Comparative Law Review).
107 Jones, supra note 102, at 19.
10' Davis, supra note 98, at 308.
109 CHEN, supra note 88, at 194.
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the Communists, and efforts to strengthen its legal system were put
on hold. Led by future party chairman Mao Zedong, the
Communists defeated the Nationalists in 1949, and one of the first
acts of the new government was to repeal all the laws of the old
Nationalist government. 110 The western concept of law, one based
on individual rights and administered by an impartial judiciary
separated from other branches of government was explicitly
rejected by the Communists' in favor of an oppressive regime
marked by a massive increase in executions.
IV. Mao Zedong and the People's Republic of China (1949-1976)
After the Communists won the civil war, Mao Zedong
assumed power and declared the People's Republic of China.
Whereas the Nationalists modeled their legal ideas on western
systems, the Communists borrowed heavily from the Soviet Union,
adopting a "revolutionary judicial system characterized by
informal mediation, mass trials, retributive justice, and frequent
summary executions."' 112 As Mao and the Communists worked to
bring about "rapid political, economic and social transformation,"
they simultaneously implemented policies designed to eliminate
counterrevolutionaries, ultimately resulting in mass executions;
they did this all without enacting comprehensive codes of
substantive and procedural criminal law to replace the ones they
abolished from the Nationalist government. 113  Under Mao,
China's form of law was characterized as an informal "societal"
model, focusing on "socially approved norms and values,
inculcated by political socialization and enforced by extrajudicial
apparatuses consisting of administrative agencies and social
organizations." 114 After the initial years of what some scholars
called a "legal vacuum," the People's Republic of China adopted
its first Constitution in 1954 and began drafting major codes,
110 Jones, supra note 102, at 20-21.
III Id. at 22.
112 Davis, supra note 98 at 309.
113 Id. at 309-310.
114 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 7.
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individual laws, and regulations. 115 However, political leaders
began to criticize the development of comprehensive codes,
arguing that institutions and rules should not be fixed, but dynamic
and flexible. 116 Meanwhile, Mao continued his goal of eliminating
all sources of political opposition and ridding society of anti-social
elements that threatened public order. 117 Mao used capital
punishment to control political and social life and harsh criminal
sanctions were often justified to "frighten the enemy and support
the class struggle of the masses."' 118  The Maoist regime
culminated in the chaotic Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, when
the government launched a massive purge of all those who
opposed Mao, resulting in mass trials, execution quotas, and the
persecution of tens of thousands of Chinese. 119
Mao wielded the death penalty primarily as a political tool
to eliminate opponents and promote the establishment of a socialist
government. In the absence of a formal criminal justice system, no
comprehensive legal codes or theories of punishment existed, and
hence no concept of proportionality. After a period of
revolutionary violence, Mao interestingly once expressed concern
about the death penalty and advocated its cautious application. In
his famous speech, "The Ten Major Relationships," delivered in
1956, Mao stated: "Once a head is chopped off, history shows it
cannot be restored, nor can it grow again as chives do, after being
cut. ' 12°  Mao effectively acknowledged the permanent and
irrevocable nature of capital punishment and implied that it should
be employed reservedly. Nevertheless, the Maoist regime carried
out thousands of executions in an era that was devoid of any
concept of proportionality or procedural safeguards for criminal
defendants.
115 CHEN, supra note 88, at 39.
116 Id.
117 JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 106, at 57.
118 Davis, supra note 98, at 312.
119 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 22.
120 Davis, supra note 98, at 310 n.40.
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V. Deng Xiaoping and the Anti-Crime Campaigns of the 1980s
After Mao died in 1976, a faction led by Deng Xiaoping
prevailed in the vying for power in the upper levels of the
Communist Party that followed. 121  The anarchic Cultural
Revolution had severely damaged the legal system and left people
searching for a more regularized society. Therefore, the Deng
administration deemed legal modernization to be of utmost
importance, and some of the first pieces of legislation enacted
under Deng's leadership were the Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure Law of 1979,122 precursors to the most recent versions
discussed earlier. The former was the first comprehensive law of
its kind to define punishable acts and appropriate sanctions. Its use
of highly moralistic words such as "heinous" and "monstrous" to
describe the elements of select crimes reflected and emphasized
the retributive nature of China's criminal justice system. 123 Both
acts significantly enhanced the predictability and fairness of the
Chinese legal system, providing for such things as appellate
review, regularized proceedings for capital crimes, and limited
procedural protections to safeguard the rights of the defendant. 1
24
Probably the most significant provision of the new laws
was the codification of the suspended death sentence. Under this
"two-year reprieve," a capital offender could receive a stay of
execution during which he performed hard labor. 125 If the prisoner
demonstrated evidence of reform over the two years, the court
could commute the sentence to life or fixed-term imprisonment. 
126
Yet another safeguard included in the Criminal Procedure Law
provided for automatic review and approval by the Supreme
People's Court of death sentences imposed by lower courts, which
121 Jones, supra note 102, at 39.
122 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 22.
123 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 123.
124 Davis, supra note 98, at 312-13.
125 Id. at 314.
126 Id. A similar provision is now codified in the 1997 Criminal Code; See
CRIMINAL CODE art. 48-51.
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protected against erroneous and unfair judgments. 127 Together, the
new laws "prescribe[d] appropriate legal standards to guide
judicial work and the framework for 'due process' to protect the
individual.'" 12 8 Even so, the anti-crime campaigns of the 1980s
would unfortunately overshadow the positives that emanated from
these new laws.
According to one source, Deng had a "golden opportunity"
to change Chinese death penalty policy after he came to power,
and he chose not to. 12 9 The year Deng came to power marked a
crucial stage in Chinese legal history as the nation began
experiencing a massive surge in crime. Not long after the
enactment of the new criminal codes, as a move to restore public
order and security, Chinese authorities initiated a number of
campaigns to combat crime, and many of the newly legislated
procedural safeguards were stripped away. 130  In 1981, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress suspended
the Supreme People's Court's mandatory review of capital cases,
which predictably "increased the frequency and velocity" of death
sentences. 131 The early 1980s marked the first of China's so-called
"Strike Hard" campaigns, as the Standing Committee passed
resolutions designed to "strike timely and heavy blows at
offenders" who committed the most heinous crimes. 
132
The most comprehensive, harsh, and enduring crusade
began in August of 1983, when the government instituted a
nationwide crackdown on crime and ordered security forces to
round up 50,000 people considered to be criminals or
"antisocial." 133 Diplomats estimated that thousands of criminals
were executed within the first few months of the campaign.
127 See Davis, supra note 98, at 316.
128 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 86.
129 JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 106, at 67.
130 See Sunderland, supra note 97, at 22.
131 Monthy, supra note 93, at 194.
132 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 134.133 See Colin Campbell, China Suddenly Taking a Tougher Line on Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 13, 1983, at A2.
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Consistent with the collectivist and retributive philosophy of
Chinese society, radio commentators referred to the "dregs of
society" that received severe punishment because they had
"seriously disrupted the social order."' 134  The government also
began to employ overtly deterrent tactics by hanging billboards
that displayed the pictures and sentences of dozens of criminals
who had recently been executed, sending a stern message to the
public that criminals would be dealt with mercilessly. 135 Further,
the Standing Committee enacted a number of provisions that
significantly increased the number of crimes punishable by death.
As the rising number of capital crimes and executions suggests, the
anti-crime campaigns, as well as the accompanying changes in law
and procedure, severely limited the effect of legal reform
incorporated in the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law.
136
Nevertheless, Chinese authorities praised the campaigns as
necessary courses to stamp out crime and reported nearly a 60%
drop in the national crime rate over two months. 137  China
inevitably faced mounting criticism from human rights groups, but
the Chinese public did not share outsiders' perception of a major
problem. One commentator responded, "[a]nyone without bias
who is really concerned with the welfare of the people in this part
of the world will feel pleased that China is cracking down on
crime." 138  In contrast, non-domestic sources recognized the
glaring disparity in proportionality, as those executed included
"people who would have drawn moderate prison terms in Western
countries." 1
39
During the Deng era, it appears that China evinced no
concept of proportionality at all. Preoccupied with what some
scholars argue was a distorted and unfounded perception of a
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Davis, supra note 98, at 3 19.
137 Christopher Wren, Crime and Capital Punishment in China, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1983, at E9.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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drastic increase in crime, 14 the government made no effort to
match the appropriate punishment to the offense. Instead,
authorities used the anti-crime campaigns as a political response to
social change. According to Deng, economic modernization and
reform were principal objectives of legal reform, and crime was
perceived as a major threat to such development. 14 1 Therefore, it is
no surprise that in 1982, the Standing Committee drafted a
resolution on "Severely Punishing Criminals Who Do Great
Damage to the Economy," which broadened the death penalty to
cover offenses such as smuggling, selling drugs, bribery, and
embezzlement. 142  The adoption of this resolution presents two
proportionality arguments. On the one hand, perhaps the
government perceived some crimes, both violent and non-violent
alike, as equally disruptive to the socioeconomic order and
therefore equally deserving of the most severe punishment. On the
other hand, the authorities may have aimed to send a deterrent
message that any person who undermined the welfare of society in
any manner, regardless of the degree of relative harm, would be
dealt with severely. Indeed, the Chinese media acknowledged the
deterrent value of capital punishment, arguing that it constituted a
"serious warning to the criminals who.. .frenziedly sabotag[ed]
[the] socialist economy."' 143 In any case, the resolution certainly
demonstrates that "whenever the socialist system is perceived to be
threatened, [the government] will not hesitate to use harsh
measures and revise its laws to meet the challenge." 
144
V. Contemporary Chinese Law
Crime is essentially a symptom of a defective society. When the society
is completely revolutionized, it will disappear. In the meantime, the
behavior which we call criminal is eliminated by eliminating the person
guilty of it, or by getting him to see that his behavior is harmful to
140 JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 106, at 67.
141 Davis, supra note 98, at 321.
142 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 138.
143 Davis, supra note 98, at 324.
144 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 138.
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society, and thus to himself, since he exists as an aspect of the total
society. 145
The anti-crime campaigns and resulting suspensions of
procedural safeguards lasted into the 1990s. Facing pressure and
condemnation from foreign investors and the international
community at large, the National People's Congress finally
amended the Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law in 1996
and 1997.146 Although the revised codes added procedural
protections for criminal defendants, it actually expanded the
number of capital offenses, apparently to carry on the legacy of
Deng's crime prevention campaigns.147 Regardless of whether the
new capital crimes directly produced more executions, "the
proliferation of new death penalties since 1983 certainly signaled
to prosecutors and judges in the provinces that capital punishment
was a policy in favor in Beijing."' 148 Reflecting the sentiment in
the passage quoted above and the recurring theme of collective
rights over individual rights, China continues to view offenses
threatening public security as the most dangerous form of crime.
149
It is therefore no surprise that the new Criminal Code broadened
the application of capital punishment to include more socially
harmful crimes. 150  Some commentators have expressed concern
that the amendments are too sweeping and that the overly broad
definition for "endangering state security," for instance, will result
in the condemnation of a wide variety of activities. 151 Others have
lamented that the revision resembles a "death penalty code." 
152
Chinese officials, by contrast, describe these changes as a "major
step forward" in the improvement of the legal system. 153  Few
145 Jones, supra note 102, at 25.
146 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 23.
147 Id. at 30; See generally CRIMINAL CODE.
148 JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 106, at 76.
149 CHEN, supra note 88, at 187.
See generally CRIMINAL CODE art. 114-39.151 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 26.
152 CHEN, supra note 88, at 195.
153 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 18.
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Chinese scholars advocate the abolition of the death penalty.
Instead, the majority argues purely for restrictions and restraint in
its use, citing China's reputation and international trends as
principal considerations. 154 Nevertheless, China remains notorious
for maintaining the highest death penalty rate in the world and
continues to endure criticism for deviating from international
standards. 1
5 5
E. HUMAN RIGHTS
The main objective of the Chinese criminal justice system is to
protect, first of all, the socialist order and next, the people's
personal rights. 
156
As the above quote indicates, China has historically valued
social order over individual rights. This collectivist philosophy has
no doubt played a significant role in many of China's practices and
policies that generate human rights controversy today, specifically
its widespread use of the death penalty. Indeed, China has used
capital punishment as a means of preserving stability within its
society for over 5,000 years and continues to do so despite
international pressure and criticism. 157 In an effort to uphold its
promise to improve its human rights record, the Chinese
government drafted an amendment to the Constitution in 2004 that
stated simply, "[lt]he state respects and preserves human rights."' 5 8
According to one scholar, however, although China has
incorporated "human rights" into its Constitution, there is still a
long way to go before such privileges can be firmly safeguarded, 1
59
154 CHEN, supra note 88, at 195.
155 Sunderland, supra note 97, at 18.
156 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 123-24.
157 Liam P. Deeney, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 803, 813-14 (1999).
151 XIAN FA art. 33 (2004) (P.R.C.).
159 KEYUAN, supra note 2, at 4.
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as Chinese policy deviates from universally accepted international
standards. 1 60
I. United Nations
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).161
Evocative of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the UDHR establishes an individual's right of
protection from deprivation of life and declares that no person shall
be made to suffer degrading or cruel punishment. 162 The UNGA
believes capital punishment violates both fundamental rights.
163
Although China adopted the UDHR, 164 the treaty is not binding.165
Both China and the United States are major offenders as
retentionist nations, but much of the criticism is directed towards
China, perhaps due in part to its long list of capital crimes and
exceptionally high number of annual executions and to some
extent because of the attention surrounding the 2008 Summer
Olympics. This year, however, the Chinese government has an
opportunity to make good on its promise. In 1966, the UNGA
adopted Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which promotes the goals of the UDHR
by restricting the use of capital punishment, ensuring against its
arbitrary use, and seeking the ultimate abolition of the death
penalty. 166  Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR binds all signatory
countries. 16 7 In March of this year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
announced that China will ratify the ICCPR "at an early date,"
160 d. at 23.
161 John Paul Truskett, The Death Penalty, International Law, and Human
Rights, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 557, 561 (2003).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2008).
165 Deeney, supra note 157, at 803.166 Id. at 804.
167 Id.
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citing efforts to "make domestic laws consistent with international
laws. ' 68  It is unclear, however, exactly what "binding" effect
China's ratification will have on its human rights endeavors,
particularly regarding capital punishment. The United States
ratified the Covenant but made a reservation on Article 6, the
portion that deals with death penalty restrictions. 169 It remains to
be seen whether China will similarly circumvent the issue,
although it has already taken a major step by restoring mandatory
review of death sentences to the Supreme People's Court.
170
However, the government has yet to revise its Criminal Code to
restrict the number of capital crimes or seriously entertain the
possibility of abolishing the death penalty entirely.
II. Amnesty International
For decades, Amnesty International has criticized China's
widespread and largely unchecked administration of the death
penalty. During the anti-crime campaign of 1983, the global
human rights organization sent a letter to Chinese President Li
Xiannian, urging the government to halt the wave of executions.
171
The government rejected the appeal and "described the executions
as normal measure and routine work in maintaining public
order."' 172 When the National People's Congress passed the new
Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Code in 1996 and 1997,
respectively, the Chinese government hailed the revisions as major
achievements in judicial reform. Amnesty International, however,
took exception and claimed the revised laws still fell far short of
international human rights standards. 173 Today, the organization
168 China to Ratify UN Covenant on Rights, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/18/
content 6546058.htm.
169 Deeney, supra note 157, at 814.
170 Id.; Lague, supra note 15.
171 LENG & CHIU, supra note 75, at 137.
172 Id.
173 Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: Law Reform and Human
Rights, Mar.. 1, 1997 (ASA 17/014/1997), http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/
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laments the fact that the "revised" Criminal Code includes an
astounding 68 capital offenses while the government continues to
execute people at a rapid pace even for non-violent crimes.
174
During a two-week period in 2007, Chinese courts handed down
47 death sentences and carried out 14 executions for drug-related
offenses. 175 Amnesty International responded by alleging that the
government imposed capital punishment in an unfair and arbitrary
manner. 17 6  The organization also raised a proportionality
objection, maintaining that courts should impose death sentences
only for the "most serious crimes" and that the legislature should
eliminate capital punishment for non-violent crimes such as
economic and drug-related offenses.
1 77
Criticism by organizations like Amnesty International has
not gone uncontested. In March of this year, when the
organization issued one of its several reports assailing China's
death penalty policy, Chinese human rights spokespersons fired
back, claiming that western nations have been blinded by the past
and are unwilling to see the government's rapid developments.
178
According to one researcher, for instance, since the Supreme
People's Court reassumed power to review all death sentences in
2007, the number of capital punishments has dropped, with half of
the cases changed to a two-year reprieve in the end. 179 Amnesty
International acknowledges that there has likely been a significant
library/Index/ENGASA170141997?open&of-ENG-CHN (last visited Apr. 17,
2008).
174 Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: The Olympics
Countdown - One Year Left to Fulfill Human Rights Promises, Aug. 7, 2007
(ASA 17/024/2007),
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170242007?open&of-EN
G-CHN (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
175 Id.
176 Id.
17 7 Id.
178 Amnesty International Report Refuted, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 9, 2008, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/09/content-6601478.htm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008).
179 Id.
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decrease in executions since the government restored review to the
high court. 18  However, it still expresses doubts as the actual
number of executions remains a state secret and asserts that the
only way to verify any improvement is to make death penalty
statistics publicly available.
181
III. Human Rights Outlook
Regardless of whether the number of capital punishments
has decreased, China remains the world leader in executions, and
its 68 capital crimes continue to raise proportionality concerns and
draw criticism from human rights groups. As evidence of its
reform efforts, China cites mandatory review, cautious application
of law, and overall reductions in executions. I1 2 Although the SPC
reviews all death sentences, it evidently persists in applying the
substantive provisions of the Criminal Code, as criminals are
continually executed for non-violent crimes today. 
183
In 2002, Taiwan's legislature eliminated a long-standing
law that imposed the death penalty for certain violent offenses like
robbery and kidnapping.184 Additionally, Taiwan's President Chen
Shui-bian vowed in 2005 to abolish the death penalty so that his
country may one day become "a nation founded on the basis of
human rights."' 85 Although Taiwan still retains the death penalty
today, it has certainly taken steps towards human rights reform by
minimizing its list of capital crimes. China, by contrast, has
broadened the reach of the death penalty while claiming an overall
reduction in the amount of executions, even though the actual
180 Amnesty International, Human Rights in China and the Beijing Olympics:
Stop Executions, http://www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights-china-beijing-
olympics/issues/death-penalty (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
181 Id.
182 Amnesty International Report Refuted, supra note 177.
183 People's Republic of China: The Olympics Countdown One Year Left to
Fulfill Human Rights Promises, supra note 187.
184 Truskett, supra note 161, at 591.
185 Death Penalty Information Center, International News and Developments:
2005, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did 2117 (last visited Apr.
15, 2008).
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number is virtually unknown due to state secrecy. Of course,
human rights organizations like Amnesty International will
presumably never halt their criticism of China and other
retentionist nations, including the United States, until they abolish
capital punishment entirely. But if China holds its place atop the
world leaders in executions, insists on maintaining its current
criminal code with 68 capital crimes, and continues to put
individuals to death for a number of non-violent offenses, it will
likely remain the focal point of human rights criticism and
controversy.
F. LEGAL REFORM
L The New Criminal Code
In 1998, one year after the National People's Congress
revised the Criminal Code, Jeremy T. Monthy, a Chinese law
researcher, commented on the state of the criminal justice system
in his article on the death penalty in China:
[China]'s new capital punishment scheme is as or
more Confucian . . . as the system in place at the
close of the dynastic era. . . . [Its] social or
Confucian reliance on executions as public and
moral forms of justice is as strong now as it has
been throughout China's "5,000 years of history,"
and the arbitrariness and politicization of the
judicial process leading up to the execution is even
stronger than it was at the turn of the century.
While they are an earnest start, it is doubtful that
even the new Criminal Law provisions can cure
these ills.'
86
Monthy further asserts that the Chinese legal system has
taken several steps backward, as its death penalty policy and
purportedly revised criminal law resemble the practices of the
imperial era. 187 When the Chinese legislature drafted the new law,
186 Monthy, supra note 93, at 191.
187 Id. at 212.
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it attempted to cure the arbitrary administration of death sentences
by eliminating the overtly political and excessively broad category
of "counterrevolutionary" crimes. 188 However, it also expanded
the courts' discretion and authorization to impose capital
punishment by introducing a host of new death-eligible crimes
including non-violent offenses. 189  The expansion of the death
penalty is hardly a surprise, as the criminal law revisions came in
the wake of the anti-crime campaigns, and the government aimed
to send a message that any person who threatened the existence of
the state would be dealt with severely. 190 Despite the supposedly
progressive utilitarian effort, some scholars argue that the goals of
the state are no more modern than those of the most barbaric rulers
of the Qing Dynasty. Still others denounce the new criminal law
as one of the most violent codes since the imperial era and still
prone to arbitrary enforcement. 191 For instance, anyone involved
in the smuggling of counterfeited currency can be put to death "if the
circumstances are exceptionally serious."192  With such ambiguous
language, especially for a non-violent crime, arbitrary
administration of the death penalty is inevitable. 193  Hence,
reflecting Monthy's assertion quoted above, the 1997 revision of
the Criminal Code has been a "major disappointment," and perhaps
it is time for the government to consider revising the law once
again. 19
4
II. The Role of the Judiciary
According to the Chinese Constitution, "[t]he people's
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power
independently and are not subject to interference by administrative
188 Id. at 204.
89 Id. at 204. The 1979 Criminal Code prescribed twenty-eight capital offenses
while the revision contains sixty-eight. CHEN, supra note 88, at 194; See
generally CRIMINAL CODE.
190 Monthy, supra note 93, at 204.
191 Id. at 210-11.
192 CRIMINAL CODE art. 151.
193 See infra Part F.II.a.
194 CHEN, supra note 88, at 196.
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organs, public organizations or individuals."' 195  Despite this
provision, Chinese courts have remained highly susceptible to
political influence on broad policy matters and high profile
cases. 196 Historically, the judiciary has not been as autonomous as
the Constitution envisioned, and the subsequent adverse effects on
death penalty policy persist today.
a. The Li Fuyong Case
One of the first cases published in the Gazette of the
Supreme People's Court provides an example of how political
influences affect the judiciary, as well as a demonstration of the
inherent proportionality problem in the Criminal Code. In 1985,
Chinese authorities arrested a man named Li Fuyong for cutting
and stealing electrical transmission wires from several villages,
causing massive power failures across a large region of the
country. 197 A lower provincial court convicted Li of violating
Article 110 of the 1979 Criminal Law, which provides in relevant
part that, "[w]hoever sabotages means of... electric power or gas
equipment ... causing serious consequence, is to be sentenced to
not less than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment, life
imprisonment, or death."'198  After reviewing the case, an
intermediate court found that Li's actions had caused "grave harm
to public security and serious damage to the production" of the
affected villages and sentenced him to death "[i]n order to maintain
the security and order of society . . . . 199 The Supreme People's
Court agreed to review the case and issued a brief opinion, simply
holding that all lower courts were "absolutely correct" and that the
offense of sabotaging power facilities, "being currently a serious
195 XIAN FA art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.).
196 Monthy, supra note 93, at 205.
197 NANPING Liu, OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION IN CHINA 250-251 (1997).
198 Id. at 162, n.171 (quoting CRIMINAL CODE art. 110). The current Criminal
Code includes a virtually identical provision, including the very same sentencing
guidelines. See CRIMINAL CODE art. 119.
19 9 Id. at 25 1.
2008
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
crime, causing harm to the security of the society and to the
construction of the socialist modernization, shall be given speedy
and severe punishment.
'
"
200
In his book on judicial interpretation, Nanping Liu, a law
professor at the University of Hong Kong, criticizes the Court in
the Li case for its use of mere political - rather than legal -
reasoning. 201 The Court's main function, according to Liu, is to
engage in legal reasoning by indicating what statute or precedent
applies to each case.20 2 In the Li case, however, the Court ignored
its primary duty and based its decision upon current political and
government policy.20 3 According to the Criminal Code, because
the Court found that Li's conduct caused "serious consequences,"
it had three different sentences from which to choose: not less than
ten years imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death.20 4 Not only is
the Code silent on exactly how serious a consequence must be to
render a crime punishable by death, but the Court failed to provide
any guidance on how to administer the proper sentence, finding
only that the punishment was "absolutely correct" because the
crime harmed the "security of society and.. .the construction of
socialist modernization. '" 205 Instead of basing its decision on legal
considerations, the Court revealed its susceptibility to political
influence as well as its intent to coordinate the ruling with Deng
Xiaoping's anti-crime campaigns. 20 6 Before the Li case, the Court
had never imposed the death penalty for such an offense. 20 7 In
fact, before the decision was published, a man who committed the
same crime was sentenced to only 12 years imprisonment. 20 It is
therefore highly unlikely that the Court's decision was informed by
any legal principle of proportionality. Rather, the Li Fuyong case
201 Id. at 253.
201 Id. at 161.
2 0 2 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 162, n.171 (quoting CRIMINAL CODE art. 110).
205 Id. at 253.
206 Id. at 164.
207 Id. at 163.
208 Id. at 164.
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was a direct response to the government's objective of maintaining
an anti-crime movement and protecting the socialist cause.
209
b. Achieving Judicial Independence
As the case of Li Fuyong indicates, the Chinese
government exerts an extraordinary amount of pressure and
influence on the courts, thereby undermining the constitutional
mandate of judicial autonomy and freedom from interference by
other bodies of government. This notion of "separation of
powers," which is deeply rooted in American history, has yet to be
fully realized in China because it is difficult for the courts to ward
off influence by the single-party government. 2 10  For instance,
because the courts depend on local governments for financial
support, judges tend to obey the instructions of political leaders. 211
Furthermore, the Communist Party regards supervision of judicial
functions as a necessary measure to curb corruption and improve
212justice, although the government at times oversteps what few
bounds actually exist. In practice, courts answer to legal
committees run by the Communist Party, and decisions in cases
that involve delicate issues are often decided by ranking party
officials instead of judges.213 In a 2007 speech, Luo Gan, a
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, asserted that the
Communist Party must maintain its dominance over the courts and
reiterated the intrinsic bond between the government and the
judiciary: "There is no question about where legal departments
should stand. The correct political stand is where the party
stands. '214 Today, government policy continues to guide the work
209 Id.
210 KEYUAN, supra note 2, at 151.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 165.
213 Id. at 170.
214 Joseph Kahn, Chinese Official Warns Against Independence of Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A5.
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of the courts, while the Communist Party-not the law-reigns
supreme.215
The relationship between the government and the judiciary
is no doubt a dangerous one. History demonstrates that the
political sentiment of the time can significantly influence both the
seriousness of a crime and the severity of the corresponding
punishment. 216 While all eyes are on China during the Summer
Olympics, the penal system will likely keep a low profile. Still,
China may be just one crime wave away from experiencing
another spike in death sentences and executions.
c. The Five-Year Plan and SPC Review
In October 2005, the Supreme People's Court issued a
Five-Year Plan to increase judicial reform, setting out specific
goals to improve the court system.2 17 In order to remedy the
effects of government interference and protect against the arbitrary
enforcement of rules, the Court set out to ensure the "uniform
application of the law."218 One key development in addressing this
issue is the greater use of precedent in deciding cases. In the past,
the doctrine of stare decisis, so prevalent in the American judicial
system, had not existed in China. When the Court began
publishing its opinions in the SPC Gazette in the 1980s, judges did
not view cases as authoritative law that carried the force of
precedent. 219  Instead, courts looked to past cases merely for
guidance, and did not feel that they were bound to earlier
decisions. 220 Today, the trend has reversed, and courts are now
beginning to examine precedent more closely when undertaking a
complex legal matter. 221 Consideration of precedent is indeed a
215 KEYUAN, supra note 2, at 168-69.
216 See generally supra Part D.V.
217 Susan Finder, Reforming the People's Courts, CHINA LAW & PRAC., June
2006, at 36.
218 See Id.
219 See Liu, supra note 197, at 145.
220 Id.
221 Finder, supra note 217, at 36.
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crucial development, as courts will ideally seek to avoid
inconsistent decisions like Li Fuyong, and compensate for the
ambiguous language in the Criminal Code. However, if the courts
continue to operate under the constraints of the Communist Party,
the Plan's objectives may never be fully realized.
Perhaps the most important and most obvious legal reform
instituted in recent years is the reinstatement of mandatory review
of all death sentences to the Supreme People's Court.222 The new
law requires a panel of three judges to review each death sentence
by checking facts, laws, criminal procedure, and precedent.
223
According to Xiao Yang, the SPC's chief judge, since the new law
took effect in early 2007, "capital punishment has been 'strictly,
cautiously and fairly' meted out to the tiny number of serious
criminal offenders in China." 224 Commenting on proportionality,
Xiao added that the SPC is working to ensure that the death
penalty only applies to individuals who commit "extremely
serious, atrocious crimes that lead to grave social
consequences. "225 Another SPC judge stated that the Court has
rejected about fifteen percent of the death penalties it has reviewed
226since January 2007. Furthermore, according to Chinese
officials, the number of death sentences handed down with a two-
year reprieve currently outnumbers immediate executions.
227
When asked about the future of the death penalty in China, Xiao
responds that it is "too early and unrealistic" to abolish it now
222 See supra note 15.
223 Xinhua.net, Chinese Courts Convict Over 759,230 People Last Year,
CHINACOURT, Jan. 8, 2007, http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id4127
&k title-death.
224 Xinhua.net, Top Judge: Death Sentences Meted Out Only to "Tiny Number of
Felons" in China, CHINACOURT, Mar. 10, 2008, http://en.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id-4281 &k title-death.
225 Id.
226 Xie Chuanjiao & Xu Chunzi, A Visionary's March Toward the Rule of Law,
CHINA DAILY, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/
2008-03/1 l/content 6525380.htm.
227 Id.
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because of the nation's long history of capital punishment.228
Evoking both utilitarian principles and China's deeply rooted
pattern of collectivist retributivism, Xiao insists that China must
retain the death penalty as "an effective deterrent," and adds that
even non-violent criminals, including those involved in financial
offenses, "deserve death if their actions are extremely harmful to
society." 229 Nevertheless, Xiao maintains that the SPC must utilize
its restored power efficiently, and advises judges to exercise
extreme caution and consider human rights when handing down
death sentences.
230
Although China has demonstrated noteworthy efforts to
reform its death penalty policy, its insistence on adhering to the
current Criminal Code fails to properly address the proportionality
problem. As long as the government continues to execute non-
violent criminals, China will remain among the world leaders in
capital punishment and the firestorm of human rights outcries will
never cease. Indeed, China may not perceive the situation as a
problem, citing the overall reduction in executions as a major
improvement. However, if China aims to conform to international
human rights standards, perhaps it is time to reevaluate what it
means to commit an "extremely serious, atrocious crime."
G. CONCLUSION
In 2003, a Louisiana court convicted 43-year-old Patrick
Kennedy of raping his 8-year-old stepdaughter and sentenced him
to death.23' Under Louisiana's aggravated rape statute, if the
victim is under the age of thirteen, the state may seek the death
penalty.232 Even though the courts had never before imposed the
death penalty under this particular statute, the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed Kennedy's sentence and held that because of the
"heinous nature of the crime and the severity of the injuries
22 8 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 State v. Kennedy, 957 So.2d 757, 760 (La. 2007).
232 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2)(a)(2008).
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sustained by the victim," the death penalty "is not disproportionate
under the Eighth Amendment." 233 Last January, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.234 During oral
arguments, the Court focused on whether "evolving standards of
decency" in the United States prohibits capital punishment for any
felony but murder under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. 235 Unlike Chinese courts, which have historically allowed
the government and Communist Party to dictate the severity of
crimes and corresponding punishments, the United States Supreme
Court has generally based its capital punishment decisions on the
morality of contemporary society, evaluating how the general
public perceives a particular offense. 236 In the past decade, for
instance, the Court has used the "evolving standards" criterion to
prohibit the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants 237 and
juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen. 238 Thirty years ago,
the Court held that the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 239 and since
then, no person has ever been executed for rape not involving the
victim's death. An affirming opinion by the Court and the ultimate
implementation of Kennedy's sentence would mark the first
execution for the crime of rape in 44 years.
240
On June 25, 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the
Louisiana state courts, holding that the Eighth Amendment
233 Kennedy, 957 So.2d at 793.
234 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008); Robert Barnes, Justices Uphold
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WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2008, at Al.
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ssearch.
236 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 88, 101 (1958).
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238 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime
did not result in the victim's death:
Consistent with evolving standards of decency and
the teachings of our precedents we conclude that, in
determining whether the death penalty is excessive,
there is a distinction between intentional first-
degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide
crimes against individual persons, even including
child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be
devastating in their harm, as here, but "in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and
to the public," they cannot be compared to murder
in their "severity and irrevocability.
241
Drawing upon the posture and sentiment of contemporary society,
the Court concluded that there was a "national consensus against
capital punishment for the crime of child rape."'242 The Court also
cautioned, "When the law punishes by death, it risks its own
sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional
commitment to decency and restraint."
243
One cannot overlook China's distinctive features that place
its criminal justice system on an entirely different level: a
collectivist society that devalues individual rights, 68 capital
crimes, executions of non-violent offenders, and egregious
political interference with the judiciary. The United States, by
contrast, recognizes fundamental liberties, derives influence from
contemporary societal morality, and adheres to a principle of
proportionality deeply rooted in history and tradition under the
Eighth Amendment. The Chinese criminal justice system is
historically opportunistic. It has generally disregarded the
principle of proportionality and administered punishment in a
manner that is best suited to meet the needs of its socialist society
241 Kennedy v. Louisiana, --- S.Ct. -----, 2008 WL 2511282 (U.S.) (citing Coker,
433 U.S. at 598).
2 4 2 Id. at *18.
243 Id. at *9.
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and the political goals of its leaders. Both Mao and Deng viewed
the law as an instrument of governmental policy. Under Mao, the
government endorsed severe sanctions for individuals who
disrupted the social order or thwarted the interests of the
revolution. Similarly, because crime directly threatened Deng's
ultimate goal of economic modernization, the government
launched massive campaigns to eradicate offenders and
subsequently broadened the use of capital punishment. Death
penalty policy was guided not by any principle of proportional
punishment or individual rights, but distorted primarily by the
welfare and security of the socialist system.
Only recently has China formally recognized and adopted a
concept of proportionality, 244 albeit one that appears to belie the
multitude of capital crimes listed in the Criminal Code. The
authority and responsibility to draft a revised Code belongs to the
National People's Congress, but an analysis of the legislature lies
beyond the scope of this article. In the meantime, though, the
Chinese judicial system must reevaluate the severity of its crimes
and punishments, perhaps drawing upon "evolving standards of
decency" in lieu of allowing governmental and political policy to
direct its decisions. Both the United States and China are world
superpowers, and both nations retain the death penalty as a means
to punish its most serious criminal offenders. As long as they
refuse to abolish capital punishment, both will continue enduring
criticism from human rights groups. The difference, of course, is
the obvious disparity in capital offenses and executions that makes
China's death penalty policy so salient. China, like the United
States, is recognized as a world leader, but until its government
carries out substantial improvements to its judicial system and
seriously considers revising the Criminal Code, the international
community will continue to label China as the world leader in
human rights violations.
244 See CRIMINAL CODE art. 5.
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